Judicial Independence under Scrutiny: What Were the Assurances UK Judge had received?
UK judge’s recorded reference to assurances, two refusals of permission to appeal and questions about who was asked to examine the evidence have brought a property dispute into a wider debate about judicial independence.
Public Confidence in the Judiciary Depends Fundamentally on Institutional and Operational Independence
Public confidence in the justice system depends on more than whether a party wins or loses. It depends on whether judges appear independent, whether possible conflicts are addressed openly and whether serious concerns receive a reasoned answer. When evidence surfaces about private contact between a judge and people connected to one side of a dispute, the issue is not settled simply by repeating that the judiciary is independent. The circumstances must be examined.
That debate has recently surfaced in national reporting. In November 2025, Novara Media reported that Sir Martin Chamberlain had been replaced shortly before a judicial review concerning the proscription of Palestine Action, and noted that he had also been replaced in a separate legal challenge involving UK exports of F-35 components. Campaigners quoted in the report questioned the lack of explanation and warned that unexplained changes to judicial panels can undermine public confidence.
A dispute in a small North Wales town brings the question of independence down to a specific record. A British Citizen of ethnic minority origin bought premises beside St Asaph Conservative Club in 2019. A piece of land that was historically included in his predecessor’s title was gifted to the Conservatives after years-long harassment and racial discrimination. For him, the certified 161-page record of the First-tier Tribunal hearing on 20 May 2026 is the first hard documentary evidence that demonstrates the closeness between judicial decision-makers and political interests that has been long suspected.
What were the assurances—could they relate to the later refusals?
After the claimant and his representative had left the hearing, First Tier Tribunal Land Chambers Judge Robert Brown remained alone with the Conservatives and discussed the next steps with the Conservatives' barrister. The record quotes the judge saying, “Because we’ve won” that is, including himself in the victory. It also records the Judge saying to the Conservatives' solicitors, John Owens: “I received assurances, Mr Owens, who’s there, was sceptical about those assurances, and I, I told Mr Owens in terms not to worry about it … the Tribunal had to do what it could to manage this to some sort of conclusion.”
The question is direct: what assurances was Judge Brown referring to, who gave them, and what did they concern? Was the claimant put through a sham court case? The claimant says these words had not previously recorded in the official court papers and believes they point to private contact that has not been adequately explained.
On a previous occasion, CCTV and Ring-doorbell recordings captured Judge Brown speaking with the Conservatives alone, that is without the claimant's reference. The claimant therefore had his prior concerns about the closeness between the Conservatives and the judiciary.
What the recordings show, the context of the conversations and how that material was dealt with are now central questions.
The political dimension is central to the claimant’s argument. The opposing party is St Asaph City Council with predominantly Conservative Councilors, in proceedings concerning the land beside the St Asaph Conservative Club. The judicial review papers argue that the Club’s political association matters and note that it's former MP, Dr James Davies, sat on a parliamentary committee overseeing the judiciary and the HMCTS. The claimant says this context makes it especially important to establish what was meant by those assurances.
The sequence that followed makes the question more alarming. On 4 August 2026, Martin Rodger KC, the Deputy Chamber President of the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), refused permission to appeal. The claimant says supplementary submissions filed on 29 July, setting out the strongest passages from the newly obtained hearing record and applying the apparent-bias test in Porter v Magill and the judicial-intervention principles in Serafin v Malkiewicz, were ignored in the refusal. On 5 August, the Tribunal wrote that Rodger KC had occasional contact with Judge Brown concerning the matter but denied it had given assurances.
It remains, the refusal did not engage with the specific passages submitted, and who gave the assurances mentioned by Judge Brown. He further asks whether the two later refusals of permission to appeal—the Upper Tribunal refusal on 4 August and Judge Brown’s refusal concerning the costs assessment on 28 September—could have been what the earlier assurances related to. That is the question he wants investigated.
In the 28 September refusal, Brown characterized claimant's complaints as “spurious complaints”, “misinterpretations and/or misstatements of the transcript” and “a convoluted theory of a conspiracy”. The claimant says those labels did not answer the precise question raised by the judge’s recorded words. For now, Brown faces difficulty in backtracking the words that he had already uttered and officially captured in the Copyrighted hearing transcription.
Two refusals of permission to appeal were malicious, not simply mistaken. That is the claimant’s case, and the judicial review asks whether the evidence and the applicable legal tests support it.
Chamberlain, Mould and the demand for independence
The judicial review challenges the Upper Tribunal’s 4 August decision on grounds including error of law, apparent bias, procedural unfairness and failure to consider material evidence. It also relies on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects the right to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. The claimant says the issue is not simply that permission was refused; it is that the refusal did not address the evidence and arguments he had specifically placed before the Tribunal.
The claimant asked for the matter to be referred to Mr Justice Timothy Mould, who became President of the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) on 1 August 2026—three days before Rodger KC signed the refusal. The claimant argues that Mould’s appointment only three days earlier made him unlikely to have been involved in any earlier assurances and left him well placed to consider the request without prior involvement in the events being questioned. The Tribunal did not refer the application to Mould. The claimant argues that this decision, alongside the failure he alleges to address the supplementary submissions, raises a separate question about the independence of the permission process.
Section 11A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 generally restricts judicial review of an Upper Tribunal refusal of permission to appeal, subject to statutory exceptions that include bad faith and a fundamental breach of natural justice. The claimant relies on those exceptions. R (Chowdhury) v Upper Tribunal [2025] EWCA Civ 656 considered the natural-justice exception in a case involving a relevant document not placed before the judge. Whether the present claim meets the statutory test is for the court to determine; the claimant’s argument is that the evidence he says was overlooked, in which the Judge indicates "he had received assurances" and told the Conservatives, "not to worry about their case", should be examined against the applicable legal test.
The issues were also brought to Mr Justice Sir Martin Chamberlain’s attention. His letter of 30 September 2026 said that proceedings had begun in the Administrative Court and that it would not be appropriate for him to respond to the substance of the complaints while the matter was before the court. Chamberlain has not promised to intervene or endorsed the claimant’s allegations. The claimant’s point is different: Chamberlain is not, in his view, identified with the circle of judicial figures he suspects of giving or receiving assurances connected with Conservative interests, and he wants the concerns to be considered by a judge able to decide the case on its merits.
The question for the reader is not whether a judge should “save” the claimant. He expressly says that is not what he wants. He wants an independent judge to hear the case on its merits, assess the recorded exchange in context, consider the CCTV and other material relied upon, and decide whether the grounds of judicial review are made out. What would an ordinary citizen think on learning that a judge had said he received assurances and told a solicitor not to worry? And what explanation would satisfy a fair-minded observer about the identity and subject of those assurances?
The evidence and allegations must be tested through the proper process. But a demand for independence is not a demand for special treatment. The core question is whether the recorded words, the handling of the supplementary submissions, the two refusals and the request for a newly appointed President will receive a reasoned, independent assessment. That is the issue on which public confidence now turns.
